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The Price Stabilisation Effects of the EU import regime of 
fruit and vegetables: the case of tomatoes
Abstract
The paper assesses the stabilization effects of the EU import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables based 
on the entry price system. The analysis is carried out on the EU prices of tomatoes and those of imports 
from Morocco, the main competing country on the EU domestic markets. It is based on the estimation of 
a threshold vector autoregressive econometric model that is shown capable of taking the workings of the 
import regime into account. The model shows that when prices of tomato imports are below the trigger 
entry prices the EU tomato market becomes isolated. However, the contribution of the import regime on 
price stabilization is rather limited. Since tomato imports from Morocco are granted zero tariff if their 
price is higher than the trigger entry price within a yearly quota that is completely filled, the largest 
contribution to market stabilization may well come from the size of the quota.
1. Introduction
The EU import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables (F&V) was modified in 1995 
after the signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, shifting from the old 
reference price system to the entry price system (EPS) that protected the most important 
products, while imports of other F&V products were only subject to duties. The reasons 
why the EPS was introduced and the way it worked in comparison with the old import 
regime were thoroughly discussed by Ritson and Swinbank (1995). The authors found 
that the architecture of the EPS was rather restrictive on trade and were sceptical about 
its ability to create a more open EU market of F&V. 
During the first years of implementation the EPS showed a selection effect on the 
growth of EU imports of F&V, preventing imports of low quality/price produce (Cioffi 
and dell’Aquila, 2004). However, a recent evaluation report on the EPS demonstrated 
that in recent years imports of F&V products covered by the import regime grew at a 
rate not differing from that shown by F&V not covered by the EPS (Agrosynergie, 
2008). 
This paper concerns with the analysis of the effectiveness of the EPS as a tool able 
to contribute to the stabilization of the EU domestic prices of F&V, in the sense of 
reducing the lower tail of their distribution. This was one of the main objectives of the 
reference price system introduced in the 1972 Common Market Organization of F&V, 
that is also pursued by the EPS. The stabilization effect of the EPS may arise from the 
avoidance of imports from a country when their market price or, as we will see in the 
following pages, an index built on it called Standard Import Value (SIV), is below the 
trigger entry price (TEP). 
The analysis is carried out on tomatoes imported by the EU from Morocco, whose 
SIVs have often been below the TEP and it is built around identifying the relationships 
between the tomato SIVs and the price of tomatoes observed on production markets in 
Spain, i.e. the main competitors of Moroccan tomatoes on the EU market. 
Our empirical analysis hinges on the idea that if the EPS affects price series they 
cannot be described by a random walk. We will show that since price behaviour is 
constrained by the EPS, specification of linear models is unable to ascertain price 
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2relationships. Therefore we estimate and test a nonlinear threshold model as proposed 
by Tong (1978, 1990) and generalized in the multivariate case in Tsay (1998). By 
means of this nonlinear specification we will be able to identify price relationships on 
different markets. 
In our analysis we discuss the workings of the EU import regime as applied to 
tomatoes and the preference system granted to tomatoes imported from Morocco. The 
discussion will show that the case of tomatoes particularly fits to understand the effects 
played by the EPS on the stabilization of EU market prices. Relationships between 
Spanish tomato prices and the SIVs of Morocco imported tomatoes are then identified. 
The last part of the paper is devoted to an econometric analysis of price behaviour,
testing the effects of the import regime on prices using a multivariate threshold model.  
2. The EU tomato import regime
Council Regulation (EEC) 1035/72 laid down rules for the common organization of 
the market, establishing in 1972 an EU import regime for fruit and vegetables. It was 
based on tariffs and on the reference price system that was applied only to the most 
important products including tomatoes. The reference price system was aimed to 
stabilizing prices on the internal market and avoiding disturbances arising from low-
price imports. Under this system, when the entry price of a product imported from one 
country was below the reference price, a countervailing levy was charged on those 
imports in addition to the most favoured nation customs duty. The countervailing charge 
was equal to the difference between the reference price and the recorded wholesale 
price of that product net of all import charges (Ritson and Swinbank, 1995). The 
removal of the countervailing charge was subject to a wholesale price of the products 
imported from that origin country higher than the reference price for at least two 
consecutive market days. Since all charges were deducted from the wholesale price, for 
its removal it was necessary to have a wholesale price higher than the reference price at 
least by the customs duty and the countervailing charge. Ritson and Swinbank (1995) 
showed that its removal was quite difficult to obtain while very often the countervailing 
charge was increased continuously until imports from that country were no longer 
profitable.
The EPS was introduced in 1995 as a result of the tariffication of the previous 
reference price system. It was applied to the products already covered by the reference 
price except a few products whose imports after the enlargement of the EU to include 
Spain and Portugal had become negligible. The functioning of the EPS is based on the 
daily calculation of the SIV of produce imported from a country. The SIV is the average 
market price of that product on the main EU markets minus deductions to allow 
distributive margins1. SIVs are published on the OJ the working day following 
calculation. If the published SIV of a product imported from a country is less than 8% 
                                                
1   SIVs are a weighted sum of average representative prices collected on the import markets within the 
EU by member states with reference to the importer-wholesaler or wholesaler-retailer stage; in the latter 
case they are reduced by 9% to account for wholesaler margin and by € 0,7245 per 100 Kg for handling 
and market taxes and charges. Representative prices are reduced by a percentage varying from 8 to 15% 
according to the different markets on which they are surveyed, in order to take account of distributive 
margins. The Commission reduces representative prices by a fixed amount of €5 per 100 Kg and of 
import duties.
3lower than the EP of that product, imports from that country, besides the tariff, are also 
charged a specific duty that is roughly equal to the difference between the EP and the 
SIV. If the SIV is below 92% of the EP, the trigger entry price (TEP) the specific duty 
applied besides the tariff is the maximum tariff equivalent (MTE). The amount of the 
MTE for the different products is generally so high that its charge would make imports 
unprofitable (Table 1 reports TEP and MTE appled to tomato imports).
Both the reference price system and the EPS calendars were scheduled in such a way 
as to increase protection in the season when EU products are sold on the market, while 
it is lowered in other periods. For many products, protection is granted only in periods 
of the year in which EU production is marketed.
The main difference in the EPS from the previous import regime is the possibility to 
apply the system on a consignment basis. While the countervailing charges of the 
reference price system had to apply to all imported products from a country, the EPS 
offers the possibility to avoid the MTE being charged, showing that the final sale price 
was high enough to make the MTE unenforceable on that consignment, giving more 
flexibility to traders (Grethe and Tangerman, 1998). This is not the only way to avoid 
the MTE. For example, a trader who on one day would be supposed to pay the MTE to 
clear customs, could wait conditions making the MTE inapplicable.
2.1 The enforcement of the EPS
Some of the studies made on the EPS have compared the daily SIVs with the TEP 
identifying the conditions making the MTE applicable (Cioffi and dell’Aquila, 2004; 
Agrosynergie, 2008; Goetz and Grethe, 2009). Since, data on the daily imported 
quantities of F&V cleared by EU custom  and the amount of specific duty collected by 
EU customs offices are not available, to investigate the effects of the EPS the 
distribution of SIVs below the TEP has been compared with the Eurostat data on 
monthly imports (Cioffi and dell’Aquila, 2004; Agrosynergie, 2008).
These studies have shown that the relevance of the EPS is not homogeneous among 
the different products. Tomatoes and lemons are the two products with the largest 
number of daily SIVs below the TEP (Agrosynergie, 2008; Goetz and Grethe, 2009). 
Generally, the relevance of the EPS is also higher for EU neighbouring partner 
countries, while is lower for farther countries, particularly of Southern Hemisphere. 
This is because the high transportation costs boost the exports of higher quality produce 
(Hummel and Skiba, 2004) that more rarely have prices below the TEP. Moreover the 
relevance of the EPS is lower for storable products that have wider opportunity to 
legally circumvent the payment of the specific duty (Cioffi and dell’Aquila, 2004).  
2.2 Preferential agreements in the EU tomato import regime
The external protection of EU F&V is modified by preferential trade agreements. 
Preferences agreed with Southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs) are particularly 
relevant to EU imports of F&V. Such preferences were first introduced in the 1970s 
within the Cooperation Agreement signed by the former EEC with Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, and generally granted a zero tariff treatment within 
an import quota. Such quotas were increased several times, partly to compensate for the 
preference erosion effects linked to EU enlargement in the 1980s to Greece, Portugal 
and, particularly, Spain. In the periods in which the reference price was in force, the 
4zero tariff was subject to the fulfilment of the reference price system. Ritson and 
Swinbank (1995) showed that countervailing charges were rather infrequently applied to 
F&V imports from SMCs. It was probably also due to the modulation of calendars in 
which preferences were granted as well as of the calendars in which the reference price 
system was enforced. These two factors modelled the EU import flows of F&V from 
SMCs that were concentrated in the periods in which either the reference price was not 
applied or preferences were in operation.
Before the EPS was introduced, the reference price was enforced on tomato imports 
in the period from April 1st to December 20th. With the introduction of the new import 
regime, the EPS was enforced on tomato imports all year round. The agreement in the 
form of an exchange of letters between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco 
established that starting from January 1st 1995 the imports of tomatoes from Morocco 
in the EU were granted a zero tariff quota subject to a reduced preferential TEP. The 
quota was agreed in 130,000 tons of tomatoes distributed in monthly quotas from 
November to March (Council Decision, 1994). It was also agreed that the quota system 
would be managed by Morocco, while the EU reserved the right to introduce a system 
of import licenses to insure the proper functioning of the agreement. Licenses were 
introduced in 1999, after several exceedances of the monthly quotas, and were fairly 
effective at controlling imports of tomatoes from Morocco working as a non-trade 
barrier (Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002). In this framework the reduced TEP granted to 
Morocco may be seen as a kind of compensation for extending the EPS to periods in 
which the previous reference price was not operating2 . 
Despite the reduced TEP, SIVs of tomatoes imported from Morocco have often been 
lower than the TEP. In certain months it is quite usual to observe SIVs below the TEP. 
However, this does not seem to have prevented the flow of imports and the import 
quotas have always been binding. This situation has been the norm since the EPS came 
into operation. In subsequent years the quota granted to tomato imports from Morocco 
was gradually increased and spread in monthly quotas from October to May under the 
reduced TEP3. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the EPS as applied to tomatoes 
and the preferences granted to Morocco. Fulfilment of the monthly quota requires strict 
management of tomato imports from Morocco. These are subdivided into roughly 
constant daily shipments (Agrosynergie, 2008).
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
Among EU members, Spain is the chief exporter of tomatoes, except in summer 
when the Netherlands takes over. Morocco is the main exporting country of tomatoes to 
the EU, with a share of about 80% on total exports. Import volumes of tomatoes from 
other partner countries are much smaller: Israel and Turkey have a share of about 7-8%. 
However, Turkey exports tomatoes mainly during summer months, while exports of 
                                                
2 Chemnitz and Grethe (2005) estimated for the period 2000-2003 a total rent from the quota of €24-36.5 
million per year, roughly 25-26% of the total export value of Moroccan tomatoes to the EU, which is 
largely captured by Moroccan operators including agricultural producers.
3 The quota was set at 150.676 tons from October to March in 2000. It was increased at 175.000 tons from 
October to May by 2003/04 with a further conditional quota of 45.000 tons by 2006/07, that can be 
subdivided at a maximum of 30% per month from November to May under the condition that the tariff 
quota was not exceeded in the previous year (Regulation 37/2004, Official Journal of the European 
Union; 2004).
5Israel are made of different varieties of tomatoes. The competition between Spain and 
Morocco is very intense due to the great similarity of their production seasons, target 
markets, technologies and varieties (de Pablo Valenciano and Perez Mesa, 2004). The 
period with the highest competition is from October to March, when imports from 
Morocco have zero tariffs if SIVs are above the preferred entry price and the volume of 
imports does not exceed the monthly quota. 
As mentioned above, the EU Commission calculates Moroccan SIVs with a daily 
frequency. Hence to assess the effectiveness of the EU tomato import regime from 
Morocco daily prices have to be considered. In our analysis we used prices of round 
fresh tomatoes from two Spanish markets, Almería and Murcia, respectively the first 
and second largest tomato exporting provinces. Their export seasons differ: Almería 
concentrates its exports in January and February while Murcia shows a more stable and 
longer season (de Pablo Valenciano and Perez Mesa, 2004). In our analysis we 
considered the period from October to May, that is the period in which there are import 
flows of tomatoes from Morocco to the European Union.
3. Methodology and results
3.1 A model of price behaviour in the EU tomato market
Analysis of the tomato preferential trade agreements between the EU and Morocco 
and of the relationships between EU supply and Moroccan imports in the previous 
sections would suggest the hypothesis that the behaviour of prices on the EU tomato 
market, at least for round tomatoes, is governed by the Spanish supply, being daily 
imports from Morocco roughly constant to stay within the monthly quotas 
(Agrosynergie, 2008). If we consider the high substitutability between Spanish and 
Moroccan tomatoes, being in practice their quality the same, we can assume that in the 
EU wholesale markets the prices of the latter would not greatly differ from the prices of 
Spanish tomatoes. Therefore, under the assumption of a perfectly competitive market, 
farm gate prices of tomatoes in Spain and Morocco would only differ for transportation 
cost. An increase of Spanish supply would cause a decrease in the price of both Spanish 
and Moroccan tomatoes on the EU markets. In this situation, if the EPS were effective, 
when the SIV of Moroccan tomatoes becomes lower than the TEP, imports from 
Morocco would decrease due to the levying of the MTE, contributing to avoid a further 
reduction in Spanish tomato prices.  
Given this hypothesis on tomato price behaviour in the EU markets, since there 
aren’t data on the price of Moroccan tomatoes, the first part of our empirical analysis 
aimed to assess the relationships between Spanish tomato prices and the SIVs of 
Moroccan imports, that can be considered a proxy of the price of those tomatoes, 
although the criteria for their calculation has remained the same since 1995, while 
distributive costs may have changed4. This part of the analysis seeks to understand how 
Spanish and Moroccan supply influence one another in market price behaviour. The 
second part of the analysis consists in the identification and estimation of an
econometric model for Spanish tomato prices. This model, as well as the analysis of 
                                                
4 A detailed analysis on the administrative procedures of the EPS scheme is available in the Evaluation 
report (Agrosynergie, 2008).  
6relationships, is subsequently modified to test the effects of the EPS. 
3.2 The econometric analysis
The daily prices data used to carry out the analysis were extracted from the Agriview 
database of the European Commission, which also includes daily prices of F&V 
collected on EU markets of different countries. Data on daily SIVs are those calculated 
by the EU Commission. All prices are reported in euro and expressed in current terms. 
Time series of daily prices and SIVs refer to weekdays from Monday to Friday and 
contain data from October to May which corresponds to the season in which tomatoes 
are imported in the EU from Morocco. Prices from the different years are combined to 
obtain a unique sample that covers the period from 10 January 2000 to 13 February 
2004. Missing observations (less than 11%) were replaced using linear interpolation at 
nearby points.
The analysis was carried out in four sequential steps: 
(i) first ADF (Augmented Dickey and Fuller) and PP (Philips and Perron) tests were 
performed to verify the presence of unit roots in the price series and their non-
stationarity that affects econometric model inference;
(ii) a linear Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) model was estimated to assess the 
relationships between Spanish and Moroccan prices, in order to understand how 
Spanish and Moroccan supply influence each other in market price behaviour;
(iii) a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model (Tong, 1978, 1990) was used to test 
whether Spanish prices time series change their behaviour when Moroccan SIVs go 
below the TEP and, hence, if time series could be split up into two different
regimes: the first that occurs when Moroccan SIVs are above the TEP, the second 
when SIVs are below and extra duty on Moroccan imports to EU is then applied;
(iv) finally, a Threshold Vector Auto-Regressive (TVAR) model (Tsay, 1998) was
estimated taking into account the presence of the threshold to ascertain the “true” 
relationships among Spanish and Moroccan prices.
In order to carry out the analyses some preliminary tests and transformations of time 
series were applied. Nelson and Plosser (1982) showed a vast majority of economic 
series could be better characterized by a unit root process than by a deterministic trend. 
Furthermore, according to other authors (Fama, 1995), price series are likely to follow a 
random walk process, this is a non-stationary process in which the autocorrelation 
function is one everywhere. This constrains the number of applicable econometric 
techniques to the non-stationary ones. Alternatively, time series should be transformed 
into stationary time series. If the data are generated by a unit root process, subtracting a 
deterministic time trend is not sufficient to produce a stationary process, while a correct 
transformation could be into difference time series (Hamilton, 1994). The presence of 
the unitary root of the price series was tested through different tests (Table 2): the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Philips-Perron (PP) 
(Philips and Perron, 1988) unit root tests were applied on the prices and SIV series, both 
in levels and differences. These tests do not allow us to accept the null hypothesis of 
non-stationarity and we can analyze them through standard regression inference. 
Note that the two tests were derived for the null hypothesis of unit roots in linear 
time series. On the other hand, if series are non-linear and the number of observations is 
large, as in our analysis, Kapetanios et al (2003) show, through Montecarlo simulations, 
that these tests continue to have the prefixed size and a high power. Kapetanios and 
7Shin (2006) derive specifically tests suited for TAR models that are slightly more 
powerful than ADF, when observations are lower than 200 (see also Bec et al, 2004), 
and equivalent for larger samples. Moreover, the alternative proposed tests and their 
power is strongly linked to the threshold constant that in our analysis is a variable (the 
TEP). This implies that these tests are not directly applicable to our analysis.
< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >
3.3 Linear VAR system
Among EU members, Spain is the main exporter of tomatoes, while Morocco is the 
main non-EU partner country. Production seasons, target markets, technologies and 
varieties adopted by the two countries are very similar; furthermore, both Spain and 
Morocco supply the French market. As a consequence, competition between Spain and 
Morocco is fierce (de Pablo Valenciano and Perez Mesa, 2004). Nevertheless, their 
export volumes are quite different: Spain’s volume is over five times greater than 
Morocco’s. This could imply a dependence of Moroccan SIVs, the proxy for Moroccan 
tomato prices in the EU, on Spanish tomato prices. In order to test this assumption and
ascertain the existence and direction of spatial and time relationships between Spanish 
and Moroccan prices for fresh tomatoes a Vector Auto-Regressive system (VAR) may 
be specified. Such specification is justified on the ground of a stochastic supply of 
Spanish tomato, while daily storage, that is possible also for a perishable product such 
as tomato, may introduce an autoregressive pattern in prices (Deaton, Laroque, 1992). 
Therefore the following VAR system was estimated:
(1) 
tt)B( εcX 
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with I an identity matrix, i matrices of parameters to be estimated, B the back-shift 
operator: BXt=Xt-1, tε a vector of white noise processes independently and identically 
distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix  to be estimate. 
As the simultaneous full information maximum likelihood estimation (Green, 1997)
was carried out considering only statistically significant lagged variables, the final 
specification is as follows: 
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or in explicit form (in parenthesis the estimated standard errors):
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where ALM, MUR, SIV are the series of prices on Almería and Murcia markets and the 
SIVs of tomatoes imported from Morocco.
If )B( is the determinant of the matrix )B( , the VAR(k) model (1) is stationary if 
all roots (characteristic roots) in 1B of 0)B(  are, in modulus lower than one. If any 
of these roots is equal to one the VAR is not stationary and has a random walk 
component. In our case it is straightforward to verify that:
)B098.0B048.11)(B270.0B178.11)(B22.0B197.11()B( 422 
allowing the eight, in decreasing order, characteristic roots:
B1=0.96, B2=0.92, B3=0.87, B4=0.60, 
B5=-0.24-i0.34, B6=-0.24+i0.34, B7=0.31, B8=0.23
with 42.0BB 65  . It is therefore possible to say that:
 )B( (1-0.96B)(1-0.92B)(1-0.87B)(1-0.60B) (1+0.48B+0.1732B2)
it is quite evident that there is a strong inertia in our series but the VAR is still 
stationary confirming the evidence from the ADF and PP tests;
9 prices in the two Spanish markets are not directly affected by the Morocco SIVs and 
vice versa. However this result may be due to the specification of the model: using a 
linear model while we have non linear phenomena;
 the existence of two conjugate complex roots imply a pseudo-periodical wave with 
period P = 6.57, very close to a week. This result could be also accounted to the 
misspecification of the model. In the next section we assess the change in behaviour
that Spanish prices show when Moroccan SIVs exceed the TEP.
3.4 Univariate TAR model
In this section, we test whether Spanish price behaviour changes when SIVs fall 
below the TEP, i.e. the condition under which the MTE would be applied to Moroccan 
imports, reducing the volume of tomatoes exported to the EU. We analyze the presence 
of two different regimes in Spanish prices, due to the applicability of the MTE when 
SIVs fall below the TEP which in our sample occurs 117 times over a total of 725 
observations. Descriptive statistics show that, for all the tree analyzed series, the two 
regimes differ substantially in mean, variance and asymmetry (figures 1 and 2): 
compared to the second regime, the first has a higher mean, larger variability and 
stronger positive asymmetry. The threshold model allows us to better investigate how 
these regimes differ.
The use of non linear threshold auto regressive models (TAR) is aimed at the 
assessment of the effects of the EPS on the tomato market. These models were first 
introduced by Tong (1978) and later formalized by himself (Tong, 1990). They have 
been widely used, because of their interpretability in many economic analysis (see 
among others Kapetanios and Shin, 2006). In TAR models nonlinearity is due to the 
continuous mixing to whom phenomena undergo through a stochastic variable of 
switching called threshold process. The standard TAR model with two regimes and k 
lagged variables in each regime is given by:
(3)   
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In our analysis d=1, while the index variable is different from the one in the standard 
model and is given by:
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The TAR model (3) is meaningful if:
 1p)I(E0 1t   and therefore has observations in both regimes;
 )B()B( 21  and the autoregressive structure of the two regimes is different in each 
of one.
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If the two stated conditions introduced are both verified, the EU import regime on 
tomatoes really affect prices and it can be assessed through the p value and the 
differences between the two polynomials )B(1 and )B(2 . From (3) it is 
straightforward to ascertain that Xt has a unit root if both regimes have a unit root. If 
only one regime has a unit root, Xt is globally stationary but locally non-stationary for 
that specific regime.
The maximum likelihood estimate of (3) for ALMt, MURt and SIVt are reported in (4)-
(6). 
FIGURE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
The models, in which the variables have been lagged up to five lags (one week), were
estimated with OLS but reported only statistically significant lagged variables. In the 
first time, the estimations were carried out without restrictions on model parameters. 
The results implied a characteristic root not significantly different from one in the first 
regime. Therefore we made a new estimation imposing a unit root in the first regime of 
each model. Also, three different dummies were introduced to consider the seasonal 
discontinuity in time series, which were all statistically not significant and were omitted 
in the final specification. Residual auto-cross correlation and partial correlation up to 20 
lags showed that there are no significant auto-cross correlation in the residuals5. 
(4)   



 



 


2t)135(.1t)137(.)332.1(1t
2t)037(.1t)037(.1tt
ALM423.0ALM349.1372.4)I1(
ALM242.0ALM242.1IALM
with N=723; adj-R2=0.96; DW=2.055; ˆ 5.58
(5)  



 



 


2t)123(.1t)126(.)283.1(1t
2t)038(.1t)038(.1tt
MUR437.0MUR368.1197.4)I1(
MUR213.0MUR213.1IMUR
with  N=723; adj-R2=0.96; DW=1.995; ˆ 5.59
(6) 


   1t)029(.694.11t1t1tt
SIV940.0391.5)I1(SIVISIV
with N=724; adj-R2=0.94; DW=1.900; ˆ 6.95
                                                
5 The relevant graphs were omitted for reasons of space and are available upon request from the authors.
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More specifically, for Almería we obtain:
2
1 B242.0B242.11)B(  ;  
2
2 B423.0B349.11)B( 
whose characteristic roots for each regime are:
24.0B,1B )1(2
)1(
1  ;  50.0B,85.0B
)2(
2
)2(
1  .
For Murcia we obtain:
2
1 B213.0B213.11)B(  ;  
2
2 B437.0B368.11)B( 
whose characteristic roots are for each regime are:
21.0B,1B )1(2
)1(
1  ;  51.0B,86.0B
)2(
2
)2(
1  .
For the SIV series we obtain:
B1)B(1  ;  B940.01)B(2 
whose characteristic roots for each regime are:
1B )1(1  ;  94.0B
)2(
1  .
From those estimates we can say that:
 the first regime for ALM, MUR and SIV are all non stationary and ALM and MUR 
show an almost identical structure in boot regimes;
 the structure of the second regime is stationary and different from the first; it has a 
moderate inertia for ALM e MUR and stronger for SIV;
 the effect of the EU import regime can be evaluated from 162.0pˆ1  and therefore 
is rather small;
 the three price are globally stationary, but locally (in the first regime) non stationary.
3.5 Threshold Vector Auto-Regressive model
In the previous section the influence of the trigger threshold on Spanish prices was 
highlighted. As a consequence, trigger price policy should be considered in the 
simultaneous equation system model estimated in section 3.1.
In order to control the effect that a change in price behaviour could have on the 
relationship between Spanish prices and Moroccan SIVs, the following simultaneous 
trivariate TVAR equation system was estimated:
(7)  
t1t1tt21t11t )I1(I)B()I1()B(I εβαX   
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In the first time, the estimations were carried out without restrictions on model 
parameters. The results implied a characteristic root not significantly different from one 
in the second regime. Therefore we made a new estimation imposing a unit root in the 
second regime.
The estimation parameters of model (7) up to five lags with the full information 
maximum likelihood method, considering only the parameters statistically significant,
are:
2
1
B
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00216.0
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034.00182.1
100
010
001
)B(ˆ




































2
2 B
000
00.4270
000.329
B
100
01.4270
001.329
100
010
001
(B)ˆ


































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or explicitly



 



 


2t)096(.1t)096(.1t
1t)013(.2t)023(.1t)028(.1tt
ALM329.0ALM329.1)I1(
SIV034.0ALM216.0ALM182.1IALM
989.1DW;97.0Radj;723N 2  ;



 



 


2t)079(.1t)079(.1t
2t)013(.2t)018(.1t)019(.1t)017(.1tt
MUR427.0MUR427.1)I1(
SIV047.0MUR238.0MUR137.1ALM044.0IMUR
973.1DW;96.0Radj;723N 2 
1t1t
2t)028(.1t)028(.1t)017(.1tt
SIV)I1(
SIV115.0SIV072.1ALM036.0ISIV






 
992.1DW;943.0Radj;723N 2 
and 











90.4876.1154.13
76.1123.3010.15
54.1310.1599.30
ˆ
εΣ ; 










130.035.0
30.0149.0
35.049.01
ˆ
εR
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For the first regime it is:
)B115.0B072.11)(B216.0B82.11)(B238.0B137.11()B( 222
1

with characteristic roots
86.0B )1(1  , 28.0B
)1(
2  , 96.0B
)1(
3
 , 23.0B )1(4  , 95.0B
)1(
5
 , 12.0B )1(
6
 .
All roots in the first regime are real and positive and therefore imply the simultaneous 
existence of six components with agreeing signs. Moreover, the first regime is 
stationary but with a strong inertia close to the non stationary unit region. 
For the second regime it is:
)B1)(B427.0B427.11)(B329.0B329.11()B( 22
2

with characteristic roots:
1B )2(1  , 33.0B
)2(
2  , 1B
)2(
3
 , 43.0B )2(4  , 1B
)2(
5
 , 0B )2(
6

therefore the second regime is not stationary, even though the process is still globally 
stationary (Niglio and Vitale, 2008). More precisely:
 the roots of the two regimes differ substantially each other: the first is stationary 
while the second is not. These differences justify the use of the two regimes and 
therefore of the threshold TVAR model;
 taking into account the univariate TAR analysis, the variables ALM, MUR and SIV 
are, as expected, cointegrated  only in the first regime;
 Spanish prices are affected explicitly by the Morocco SIVs only in the first regime 
that has a high probability to happen 839.0pˆ  ;
 Almería price affect Murcia price only in the first regime, while the opposite is not 
true. It must be recalled that Almería is the most important Spanish exporting region 
for tomatoes;
 Morocco SIVs are affected only by Almería price and only in the first regime.
Our results reinforce the idea that EPS influences the relationship between Spanish 
prices and Moroccan SIVs. More particularly, Almería prices follow an AR(2) structure 
in both regimes, albeit with different parameters. It is worth noting that the Moroccan 
SIVs affect Almería prices on the day after they are higher than the TEP. By contrast, in
the second regime when the Moroccan SIVs are below the TEP, they show no 
relationship with Almería prices. 
Murcia prices follow an AR(2) structure and are also influenced by Almería prices 
and by lagged Moroccan SIVs during the first regime. In the second regime Murcia 
prices are also unaffected by lagged SIVs, only showing an AR(2) behaviour. Finally, 
Moroccan SIVs show an AR(2) structure while are influenced by Almería prices during 
the first regime. The lack of an SIV effect on Almería and Murcia prices in the second 
regime highlights the contribution of the EPS to the stabilization of tomato prices on the 
EU markets. This effect is synthesized in the isolation of the EU market when 
Moroccan prices are particularly low. However such effect is rather small given the low 
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but statistically significant parameters shown by the SIVs in the first regime of both 
price series.
4. Final remarks
This paper sought to analyze the stabilization effects of the EPS on the prices of EU 
F&V. It focuses on the case of tomatoes, since for this product the prices of imports 
from Morocco, the main EU partner country, frequently fall below the TEP. The 
following hypothesis was tested: when the price of imports falls below that level is there 
a reaction in the level of the prices of EU domestic (Spanish) produce?
The analysis showed that a standard VAR model was unable to take into account the 
effects played by the EPS on tomato price behaviour. Econometric analysis was 
therefore carried out through threshold vector autoregressive specification in which the 
threshold is represented by a SIV of Morocco tomato imports below the TEP. 
The results of threshold vector autoregressive specification show that when 
Moroccan SIVs are below the TEP the Spanish prices follow a pattern different from 
the one shown when SIVs are higher. Moreover, while the price of Moroccan tomatoes 
affects the Spanish prices when the SIVs are higher than the TEP this does not hold
when SIVs are below this level. Econometric analysis thus showed that at least in the 
case of tomatoes, the EPS contributes to stabilizing EU domestic prices through the 
neutralization of the effects that low import prices could exert.
Our analysis also showed that although a stabilization effect exists, it is rather limited 
probably because of the relatively small size of Moroccan tomato imports compared to 
Spanish production. Imports from Morocco amount to roughly 20% of Spanish exports
to the EU market and are distributed in the period from October and May according to 
the zero tariff quotas. 
A stronger stabilization effect of the EU domestic tomato market is probably 
provided by the import quota regime in which the imports of tomatoes from Morocco 
are granted zero tariff. The size of such quotas has often been the subject of bilateral 
negotiations that brought about a gradual increase. Since the yearly quota is distributed 
in monthly quotas from October to May that cannot be overcome, the system is 
carefully managed by Moroccan exporting firms which seek to make uniform daily 
shipments capable of staying within the monthly zero tariff quotas.
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Tables
Table 1 – Preferential EP and TRQ granted to Morocco in 2006/07 and monthly imports. 
Tariff
Entry 
price
MTE
Pref. 
Tariff
Pref. 
Entry 
price
MTE TRQ
Import 
06/07
(%) (€/t) (€/t) (€/t) (€/t)
October 14.4 626 298 0 461 298 10000 10198
November 8.8 626 298 0 461 298 26000 28813
December 8.8 626 298 0 461 298 30000 34780
January 8.8 846 298 0 461 298 30000 42807
February 8.8 846 298 0 461 298 30000 45513
March 8.8 846 298 0 461 298 30000 41975
April 8.8 1126 298 0 461 298 15000 36303
May 14.4 726 298 0 461 298 4000 12671
Jun-Sept 14.4 526 298 6859
Conditional quota 2006/07 45000
Table 2 –ADF and PP tests
Variable ADF PP
(1) (2) (1) (2)
ALM -3.762 -3.774 -3.732 -3.746
MUR -3.769 -3.830 -3.798 -3.858
SIV -4.678 -4.772 -4.678 -4.772
(1) Intercept. Test critical value (5%) = -2.865;
(2) Intercept and trend. Test critical value (5%) = - 3.416.
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Figures
Figure 1 –   Regimes box – plot of ALM, MUR, SIV
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